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We provide a tractable model of counterparty risk in an intermediated risk transfer market,
and analyze the consequences of this risk being private information. We show that unknown type
information can be revealed when large trades are observable; however, the allocation is shown to be
constrained inefficient. The inefficiency is highlighted by considering the imposition of a transaction
tax, which can improve welfare by encouraging more information revelation and increasing risk
transfer. The results suggest that increased transparency and/or central counterparty arrangements
in over-the-counter derivative markets may promote transparency of counterparty risk.
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1 Introduction
Over the past thirty years the market for risk transfer has grown considerably. For example,
over-the-counter (OTC) derivative contracts grew from a notional size of 100 trillion dollars in 2001
to 614 trillion dollars as of 2007.1 Further, potential inefficiencies in these markets have been front
and center in the discussion over market reform following the recent financial crisis. A key difference
between risk transfer markets and traditional asset markets is the potential for counterparty risk.
In a standard asset market transaction, a buyer purchases an asset from a seller and the value of the
asset is not dependent on the risk of the seller. On the other hand, risk transfer contracts specify
contingent payments, the value of which depends on the counterparty being solvent when a payment
is required. For example, in a credit default swap (CDS) contract, the buyer purchases protection
against the event that some underlying debt will default. If the party which sold that protection
becomes insolvent, the contract loses value, independent of the quality of the underlying debt.
Furthermore, counterparty risk can be a source of asymmetric information, since the counterparty
is likely to know more about its own risk than the party with which it is contracting. This presents
a new avenue of study and is our key departure from the extant literature on financial markets.
We model an intermediated/dealer risk transfer market with asymmetric information over coun-
terparty quality. With simple contingent contracts written on an underlying risk, we allow for one
party who can default on their obligation and consider an environment in which counterparty qual-
ity may be unknown. Given the opacity of OTC markets (e.g., see Acharya and Bisin (2014)), we
assume that position size is generally not observed and thus non-contractible; however, it is known
whether positions exceed some large threshold. This assumption captures an important feature of
risk transfer markets, which can arise for a number of reasons. For example, under Dodd-Frank
(and the EMIR in Europe), a growing number of OTC markets now mandate large trader reve-
lation, wherein parties with a contract size over some threshold are required to report this to the
regulator, who in turn makes that information available to market participants.2 Similar arrange-
ments are being considered in many more OTC markets such as those for CDS.3 Alternatively, in
1Deutsche Bo¨rse Group, “The Global Derivatives Market: An Introduction”, White Paper (2008), BIS “Triennial
Central Bank Survey: Foreign Exchange and Derivative Market Activity in 2001”, Basel: Bank for International
Settlements (2002)).
2For example, see http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/FederalRegister/FinalRules/2011-18054
3See for example Chen et al. (2011).
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the absence of mandatory large trader reporting, we can interpret this assumption as the ability of
players to hide exposures in their financial statements, but only for relatively small positions. This
assumption can also be viewed as a reduced form way of capturing the possibility that buyers may
infer something about sellers’ total positions through their own contracts when there are relatively
few dealers, similar to the analysis in Leitner (2012).4 Consider as an example the OTC dealer
CDS market, which is dominated by 4 dealers who comprise 50% of activity, with 95%-98% of
trades having one of 14 dealers (refereed to as the G14 dealers) involved (Chen et al. (2011)).
Potential sellers are free to contract with multiple dealers if they wish. For smaller contract sizes,
it is unlikely that any dealer would learn the aggregate number of contracts that a seller has sold.
When desired positions are large however, it is likely that information can be gained by dealers who
can share/exchange some information outright or by an individual dealer inferring the aggregate
contract size given that there are a limited number of dealers with which to split contracts over.
Since position size is not generally contractible, a separating equilibrium as described in Roth-
schild and Stiglitz (1976) cannot be achieved. However, in contrast to classic market-breakdown
results like that first presented in Akerlof (1970), we show that when large traders can be identified,
some risky counterparties may freely reveal themselves, despite facing worse prices when they do
so. Potential information revelation notwithstanding, we show that the competitive equilibrium
is (constrained) inefficient, since some risky counterparties still choose to keep their type informa-
tion hidden. We show that a transaction tax on pooling counterparties can increase efficiency by
encouraging more revelation. When positions are opaque, so that there is no information on how
many contracts counterparties have written, only pooling can be supported in equilibrium. Thus,
proposals designed to increase position transparency, including central counterparty arrangements,
can actually increase transparency of counterparty risk as well.
To capture the intuition behind our results, consider two types of risk averse agents: those with
positive (or upside) exposure to some risk, and those with negative (or downside) exposure. In other
words, one type of agent benefits if some risky event occurs, while the other type suffers a loss.
We refer to parties with positive exposure as sellers and those with negative exposure as buyers.
Assume that sellers come in two types: risky and safe, differentiated by their counterparty risk.
4Leitner (2012) shows that under some conditions, a situation in which market participants learn whether an
agent’s position is above some threshold or below some threshold arises endogenously. In contrast to our model, in
his setting there is private information about an agent’s position but not underlying type.
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Parties use a contingent contract wherein all payments occur ex-post and all contracts are made
with a risk neutral competitive market maker. With full information, risky sellers receive a lower
price than safe sellers since counterparty risk is priced. With asymmetric information, risky sellers
have a choice of whether to pool with safe sellers, or to reveal themselves. For any given price, risky
counterparties will desire larger contract sizes than their safe counterparts due to limited liability.
Therefore, if risky sellers pool with safe sellers, they are forced to supply less than they would like to
at the pooling price in order to stay hidden. This tension creates an incentive for some risky sellers
to deviate and reveal themselves; by doing so they will be able to trade more, albeit at a lower
price. Even though the competitive equilibrium may feature some risky sellers fully revealing, the
allocation is shown to be information constrained inefficient, since risky sellers do not internalize
the cost that pooling has on safe sellers. In addition, pooling risky sellers do not internalize the
effect that the contraction in supply due to pooling has on buyers. In particular, when the market
maker has limits on the amount of inventory it can hold, the contraction in supply leads to an
inefficiently low amount of risk transfer for buyers.5 A social planner can effectively cross subsidize
revealing and pooling risky sellers because it is not restricted by the competition environment of
the market maker. Doing so can generate more revealing risky sellers thereby increasing welfare. A
Pareto improving policy is to introduce a transaction tax on the pool of unknown sellers, thereby
encouraging more revelation.
In a completely opaque market, only a pooling equilibrium can prevail since risky sellers can
obtain large contract sizes without being detected. Our results therefore have suggestive impli-
cations for policies that can provide position transparency such as trade reporting and central
counterparties (CCPs). In particular, CCP’s and/or regulators could potentially use position size
to endogenously promote information revelation, thereby improving information about the risk of
its members.
Related Literature
We contribute to the literature on incentives and counterparty risk and the financial markets
5Shachar (2012) provides empirical evidence that dealers do become averse to inventory risk in the presence of
counterparty risk.
4
literature. Thompson (2010), Acharya and Bisin (2014), and Biais, Heider and Hoerova (2014)
demonstrate moral hazard problems that may be present on the sell side of the market wherein
the seller may take positions which increase counterparty risk and are not in the best interest of
the buyer. In contrast, we analyze an asymmetric information problem on counterparty quality.
Stephens and Thompson (2014a) analyze exogenously given differences in counterparty risk as in
this paper, but do not consider differences in the type of risk being transferred as here. Importantly,
the driving force behind the results of our paper come from a contract size decision, whereas the
contract size is exogenous in Stephens and Thompson (2014a). Incorporating a contract size choice
allows us to create a market and study the welfare implications of asymmetric information, both
of which are not possible in Stephens and Thompson (2014a).
The financial markets literature has explored the asymmetric information problem of assets
in great detail. In contrast, we study the asymmetric information problem of counterparty risk
while we assume that the underlying risk (which is analogous to the asset risk studied in previous
literature) is known. Most relevant to our analysis are papers that model trade size and asymmetric
information. For example, Easley and O’Hara (1987) show that parties with insider information
may be willing to trade large quantities, however only a partial separating equilibrium can be
supported wherein some uninformed parties must also be willing to trade large sizes. Seppi (1990)
extends this argument and shows why uninformed traders may endogenously wish to trade large
quantities, even if this leads to less favorable price quotes as the market maker believes they are
more likely to be informed. One can draw a parallel between our risky and safe sellers and the
informed and uninformed agents from Easley and O’Hara (1987). In that paper, if there were no
uninformed traders who trade large quantities, the informed trader would be revealed and lose all
profits from superior information. In contrast, we can achieve full separation in that some risky
sellers trade large quantities despite no safe sellers wishing to do so. In addition, our general risk
transfer environment (as opposed to the insider trading setting of those papers) allows for the
introduction of counterparty risk, a welfare analysis, and new policy implications.
Non-exclusivity of contracts plays an important role in our paper, which contributes to the
literature in this area (see for example, Attar et al. (2011), Ales and Maziero (2014), and Stephens
and Thompson (2014b)). Exclusivity provides contractible information to a principal about an
agent’s allocation. Even in the absence of exclusivity, if the principal has full information about
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the allocations of agents, this can be equivalent to the case of exclusive contracts. In our case,
there is some contractible information about the agent’s position, i.e., large positions are observ-
able. Non-exclusive contracts are typically implemented with linear prices (i.e., there can be no
menus because only price is observed), which is true in our environment everywhere except at the
point at which large positions are revealed. Thus, in a sense our environment is neither entirely
exclusive nor non-exclusive. This represents a key difference between our paper and the literature
on contract exclusivity. For example, Attar et al. (2011) and Ales and Maziero (2014) show that
the equilibrium can feature a market breakdown similar to that in Akerloff (1970), wherein only
risky types participate. In contrast, the ability to observe large traders allows for an equilibrium
in which both risky and safe types participate, and ex-ante identical risky types may even trade
different amounts (for different prices).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model, while Section 3
characterizes the competitive equilibrium and the social planner’s problem with full information.
Section 4 analyzes the competitive equilibrium and the social planner’s problem with asymmetric
information on seller type. Section 5 considers restrictions to inventory and Section 6 concludes.
Section 7 contains a discussion on robustness and the Appendix contains non-trivial proofs.
2 The Model
We construct a model of buyers, sellers, and market markers. In Section 3, we analyze the
case of full information, so all of the variables to be introduced below are assumed to be common
knowledge. We revisit this in Section 4.
2.1 Market Participants
Excluding the market maker, all agents are endowed with wealth w and have preferences char-
acterized by a strictly increasing, strictly concave utility function u(x). There are two forms of
heterogeneity among agents. First, with some probability an event denoted D (‘Default’) occurs
which results in measure NB agents suffering a loss L > 0, while NS agents gain L. We denote the
state in which the event does not occur ND (‘No Default’). To fix ideas, this risk can be thought of
as an asset (or assets) that defaults and that some parties have positive exposure (will experience
6
a gain if the event occurs) while others have negative exposure (will experience a loss if the event
occurs). This creates a natural environment to study risk transfer since there will be gains to trade
for both parties from contracting. We refer to those facing a potential loss as (B)uyers and gain as
(S)ellers.
The second source of heterogeneity among agents is counterparty risk, which we capture by
allowing for sellers that are either (r)isky or (s)afe.6 Safe sellers always meet their obligations,
while risky sellers are only solvent in some states. Specifically, risky sellers may receive a shock
which wipes out their endowment and gain L such that they are unable to meet their obligations
and receive a payoff of zero. Denote the no shock event as NF (‘No Failure’) and the shock event as
F (‘Failure’). Thus, we use the word ‘Default’ to refer to the underlying event and ‘Failure’ to refer
to the counterparty. To achieve our results with the minimum heterogeneity between seller types,
we assume that the joint probability of ND and F is zero.7 We define joint probabilities pii > 0,
where i ∈ {1, 2, 3} represents the three possible states of the world as follows: pi1 = prob(ND),
pi2 = prob(D,NF ) and pi3 = prob(D,F ). Thus, pi1 is the probability that no loss/gain occurs for
the buyer/sellers, pi2 the probability that a loss (gain) occurs for buyers (sellers) and no sellers fail,
and pi3 the probability that a loss (gain) occurs for buyers (safe sellers) and risky sellers fail. Finally,
let NSr and NSs denote the number of risky and safe sellers respectively, so that NS = NSr +NSs.
2.2 Market Maker
To model an intermediated market, we assume the existence of a competitive measure one of
market makers who serve as the buyer to the sellers and seller to the buyers. To pin down the
price, we will assume Bertrand competition among market makers. We assume that a market maker
is not restricted on the amount of inventory that can be carried. This assumption is relaxed in
Section 5. For ease of exposition, we will consider buyers and sellers interacting with one market
6We assume that only our sellers are subject to the risk of failure to simplify the analysis. One could imagine that
the buyer posts the asset as collateral. Alternatively, although we will introduce our risk transfer as a contingent
contract, our results will obtain if there was an upfront payment by buyers in exchange for a contingent payment
from the seller, such as in a credit default swap contract. In this case, the payment from the buyer to the seller would
be assured.
7Without this assumption, in the risk transfer contract that we will introduce below, risky sellers will wish to
contract not only to smooth consumption across the gain and no gain states, but also to smooth consumption across
the failure and no failure states. Since the failure state does not exist for safe sellers, we restrict both seller types to
use risk transfer for the same reason. Allowing prob(ND,F ) > 0 will actually strengthen our key result; we discuss
this further in Robustness Section 7.1.
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maker.8 Finally, we assume market makers are well capitalized and risk neutral.9 Thus, when
a market maker contracts with a risky seller, and so is subject to counterparty risk, competitive
zero expected profit prices will generally require a selling price which is less than the price that
the safe seller receives or the buyer pays. In reality, dealers can (and generally do) use both the
price mechanism and collateral to mitigate the costs of counterparty risk. In the CDS market for
example, Arora et al. (2009) find that collateral is the more important of the two in mitigating
counterparty risk, whereas Morkoetter et al. (2012) show that there is a significant price impact of
counterparty risk. We could include costly collateral in place of a price differential, or have both
modeled simultaneously, without affecting our qualitative results and we choose to simply focus on
prices for ease of exposition.
Atkeson et al. (2013) show, in an endogenous market formation model, that large banks tend
to become dealers/market makers in OTC markets and contract for intermediation or trading
purposes. In contrast, medium size banks tend to be on either the buy or sell side and contract
more for hedging purposes. This is consistent with our model since hedgers are best described
as risk averse (as we model buyers and sellers), and those using the contracts as an intermediary
should be modeled as being less risk averse, in our case, we simply assume our market maker is
risk neutral.
2.3 Contracts
Agents use a contingent contract to transfer consumption between states. Buyers wish to
transfer consumption from the state in which no loss (ND) occurs, to that in which the loss (D)
occurs. For sellers, the reverse is true. Each Buyer receives γB in states 2 and 3, and pays PBγB
in state 1. Safe sellers pay γSs in states 2 and 3, and receive PSsγSs in state 1. Risky sellers pay
γSr in state 2, and receive PSrγSr in state 1 (and pay nothing in state 3). We refer to γj as the
contract size and Pj as the contract price where j ∈ {B,Ss, Sr}. All contracts are with the market
8Strictly speaking, contracts are non-exclusive given competition of market makers; i.e., a buyer or seller could split
its contract over market makers as in Stephens and Thompson (2014b). When we introduce asymmetric information
in Section 4, we can obtain our results even with a market maker choice and so we consider the buyers and sellers
interacting with one market market for ease of exposition.
9We assume that the market maker is well capitalized for simplicity, to rule out counterparty risk of the market
maker itself. We could endow our market maker with sufficient wealth such that they can never fail. Including a
wealth term would only enter our analIUysis in the two efficiency sections below and would not change the results.
8
maker who offers risk-neutral zero expected profit prices. We now formalize the buyer’s problem:
max
γB
pi1u(w − PBγB) + (pi2 + pi3)u(w − L+ γB). (1)
The buyer gives up PBγB in state one (the first term) and gains γB in states two and three (the
second term). Similarly, the safe seller solves:
max
γSs
pi1u(w + PSsγSs) + (pi2 + pi3)u(w + L− γSs), (2)
Finally, the risky seller’s problem is:
max
γSr
pi1u(w + PSrγSr) + pi2u(w + L− γSr) + pi3u(0). (3)






NSsPSsγSs +NSrPSrγSr NSsγSs +NSrγSr NSsγSs
NBPBγB NBγB NBγB
Figure 1: Payments to/from Market Maker
Note that since market maker inventory is unrestricted, buyers and sellers are not connected
since the market maker absorbs all the risk. In the following section, the results will arise from the
sellers interaction with the market maker. The buyers will be relevant when the link between them
and the sellers is present because of limits on inventory (see Section 5).
3 Full Information
3.1 Competitive Equilibrium
As a benchmark, we consider the setting in which seller type is known. The following charac-
terizes our equilibrium concept with full information.
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Definition 1 A full information competitive equilibrium is a set of prices {PB, PSs, PSr} and con-
tract choices {γB, γSs, γSr} such that
i. Given {PB, PSs, PSr}, buyers and sellers choose {γB, γSs, γSr} to maximize expected utility
defined in (1), (2) and (3).
ii. {PB, PSs, PSr} are determined by Bertrand competition between market makers, with every
buyer and seller.
In this environment we can think of two seller markets: one with safe sellers and another
with risky. The market maker offers the same price to all buyers since they are homogenous.
Since it is risk neutral and competitive, Bertrand competition implies that the market maker sells
protection to buyers at prices which yield zero profit in expectation, so that PB = (pi2 + pi3)/pi1.
Likewise, the market maker simultaneously contracts at zero expected profit from safe sellers for
PSs = (pi2 + pi3)/pi1 and from risky sellers for PSr = pi2/pi1. Lemma 1 describes consumption in the
competitive equilibrium.
Lemma 1 In the full information competitive equilibrium, buyers and safe sellers perfectly smooth
consumption over all states, and risky sellers over states 1 and 2. Equilibrium contract sizes are
γ∗B = γ
∗
Ss = pi1L, γ
∗
Sr = pi1L/(pi1 + pi2).
Proof. See Appendix.
As one would expect, risk-averse agents fully smooth consumption since they are able to shed risk
with a risk neutral market maker offering zero-profit prices. With perfect smoothing, consumption
for each type is the same in each state and denoted cB = w − L(1− pi1), cSs = w + L(1− pi1) and
cSr = w+L(pi2/(pi1 +pi2)), except for the risky seller’s failure state (state 3) in which they consume
nothing.
3.2 Efficiency and Welfare with Full Information
To study the efficiency properties of our environment, we characterize a standard Pareto prob-
lem. Individuals are indexed by k ∈ {B,Ss, Sr,M}, where B represents the buyer, Ss the safe
sellers, Sr the risky sellers, and M the market maker. Let θk ∈ [0, 1] represent a Pareto weight
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on each type of individual, normalized such that
∑









i ), where i is the state. The first-best Pareto frontier is the solution to the
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3 ≤ w(NB +NSs) + L(NSs −NB), (FA3)
where FA1, FA2 and FA3 ensure allocations are feasible; namely that total consumption in a given
state must be less than or equal to the total endowment in that state. Importantly, FA3 shows
that in the failure state of the risky seller (state 3), the consumption of the risky seller is forced to
be zero to correspond with the assumption in the competitive market environment that no hedge
for this risk exists.10
Lemma 2 The full information competitive equilibrium is efficient.
Proof. See Appendix.
As in the competitive equilibrium, the first order conditions of the Pareto problem characterize
a set of social optima in which buyers and both seller types fully smooth consumption across all
states (with the exception of the failure state for risky sellers).
10If a planner could hedge this state of the world, then it is obvious that the market outcome will be inefficient.
Thus, we impose this restriction on the planner as well so that we can focus on the inefficiency due to asymmetric




We now consider the setting in which information regarding seller failure risk is private, and
the market maker cannot directly observe the contract size.11 All other variables remain common
knowledge. To analyze the set of equilibria in this environment we need to characterize the beliefs
of the market maker, which determine prices. Sellers cannot simply tell the market maker their type
(i.e., there is cheap-talk) and thus risky sellers can pool with safe sellers and receive a higher price
than if they were revealed as risky. Despite this, risky sellers may knowingly reveal themselves
as risky through their risk transfer decision (why they may wish to do this is discussed below).
Accordingly, the market maker chooses two prices; one for revealed risky sellers and the other for
what we refer to as pooled sellers, who may be either risky or safe. Denote the fraction of risky
sellers that reveal their type by ρ ∈ [0, 1], and the probability of a seller being safe in the pool by
φ. Although complete information regarding positions is not generally available when contracts are
written, as discussed in Section 1 we assume that dealers can identify whether a counterparty has a
position above some threshold, i.e., is a “large trader”. Denote this threshold γ, which is assumed
to be an exogenous positive constant. Importantly, since market players do not learn the contract
size, only that a player is above some threshold, a market maker will not offer a complete menu of
contracts (as in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) for example). This corresponds to what we observe
in real world OTC markets, since we do not observe dealers offering a full menu of contracts to
buyers and sellers as seen in traditional insurance market. The way in which type information is
revealed is important to the strategic behavior of risky sellers. In particular, we assume that market
makers know that risky sellers wish to sell more at any given price than their safe counterparts.12
Thus, it is plausible that type information is conveyed when the contract size is above that which
is optimal for safe sellers.
Consider a price Pˆ with corresponding γ∗Ss(Pˆ ) and γ
∗
Sr(Pˆ ), defined by (2) and (3) respectively.
11This is to be distinguished from a potential asymmetric information problem on the underlying risk as considered
in, among others, Acharya and Johnson (2007) and Stephens and Thompson (2014b). We model only one type of
underlying risk, so that we can clearly elucidate the problem of asymmetric information on counterparty risk.
12This can be easily shown by inspecting the first order conditions from the safe and risky seller problems (2) and
(3).
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Three cases are possible:
i. γ∗Ss(Pˆ ) < γ
∗
Sr(Pˆ ) < γ
ii. γ∗Ss(Pˆ ) ≤ γ < γ∗Sr(Pˆ ).
iii. γ < γ∗Ss(Pˆ ) < γ
∗
Sr(Pˆ )
Case i corresponds to an environment in which the threshold to be revealed is higher than what
either type would wish to choose. As a result, information will not be revealed in equilibrium. In
Case ii, a risky type may have an incentive to choose a lower contract size to receive a higher price.
Case iii corresponds to an environment in which the safe type may have an incentive to choose a
lower contract size to receive a higher price. Case ii is presumably the most interesting since γ is
between what each seller type would choose in the absence of private information. While we focus
on case ii, the analysis of case iii is very similar and thus we omit this for the sake of brevity (case
i is straightforward). We assume that the market maker’s beliefs satisfy the following.
Assumption 1 Assume case ii holds. Market maker beliefs satisfy:
• If the seller chooses a contract larger than γ, beliefs are that the seller is risky.
• If the seller chooses a contract less than or equal to γ, beliefs are not updated and reflect
population averages.
Zero profit prices (which result from Bertrand competition) for the buyers and revealed risky
sellers are unchanged from the case of full information, PB = (pi2 + pi3)/pi1 and PSr = pi2/pi1





We define the contract sizes γB, γSs, γSr as before, however γSr is now interpreted as the contract
size of a revealing risky seller. We also define γ˜Sr ≤ γ as the contract size of a pooling risky seller.
We can now give the expression for φ, the probability of a seller in the pool being safe.
φ =
NSsγSs
NSsγSs + (1− ρ)NSrγ˜Sr ∈ [φ, 1]. (6)
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Where φ denotes the probability of a seller being safe in the pool given that all risky sellers are





In equilibrium (to be defined below), if there is to be an interior solution (whereby some risky
sellers reveal and some pool) a risky seller must be indifferent between revealing and pooling.
Define the indirect utility of a risky seller revealing as V rev, and a pooling as V pool(φ), when there
is a proportion φ safe sellers in the pool. Let V(φ) ≡ V rev − V pool(φ), which is given by:
V(φ) = pi1u(w + PSrγSr) + pi2u(w + L− γSr)− [pi1u(w + P˜ (φ)γ˜Sr) + pi2u(w + L− γ˜Sr)]. (8)
We now augment Definition 1 to allow for asymmetric information.
Definition 2 A competitive equilibrium under asymmetric information is a set of prices {PB, PSr, P˜ (φ)},
contract choices {γB, γSs, γSr, γ˜Sr}, market maker beliefs and a pool quality φ such that:
i. Given {PB, P˜ (φ), PSr}, buyers, safe sellers and revealed risky sellers choose {γB, γSs, γSr} to
maximize expected utility defined in (1), (2) and (3). Pooling risky sellers choose γ˜Sr given
market maker beliefs.
ii. Market maker beliefs satisfy Assumption 1.
iii. {PB, P˜ (φ), PSr} are determined by Bertrand competition among market makers, with each
buyer, pooled seller, and revealed seller.
iv. V(φ) ≥ 0 when φ = 1, V(φ) = 0 when φ ∈ (φ, 1), V(φ) ≤ 0 when φ = φ.
The safe sellers’ problem is straight-forward, and is characterized by (2) at the zero-profit price
implied by Bertrand competition, PSs = P˜ (φ). The risky sellers’ problem is more complex, since
they will receive price PSr if they reveal and choose contract size according to (3). Alternatively,
they can mimic the safe types and receive the higher price P˜ (φ); however, Assumption 1 implies
that the contract size that they must choose cannot exceed γ. Anything less than this amount
would lower the utility of a risky seller, and anything greater would reveal their type. Therefore,
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in equilibrium γ˜Sr = γ. We now state the main result of the section; namely that self-revelation
can exist in competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 1 The competitive equilibrium with asymmetric information is characterized by φ∗ ∈
[φ, 1). Self-revelation of a subset of risky sellers, φ∗ ∈ (φ, 1), can be supported as an equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
With a standard asymmetric information problem, the “risky” type prefers to pool with the
“safe” type because they receive a better price. This is the reasoning behind the classic Akerlof
(1970) lemons result. In our model however, there is a second effect which works against pooling:
imitating the safe seller requires the risky seller to take a contract size of γ. As more risky sellers
reveal, the quality of the pool increases and so too does the price that those who remain in the
pool receive. The limiting case in which all risky sellers reveal (ρ = 1 so that φ∗ = 1) is not an
equilibrium, however. This case would correspond to the full information environment described in
Section 3. From Lemma 1, we know that with full information the safe and risky sellers perfectly
smooth consumption over states 1 and 2 (with the safe seller also smoothing over state 3). Since a
safe seller receives a higher price, it obtains higher consumption in every state relative to a risky
seller. Thus, given that no other risky sellers pool, a single risky seller could pool and receive a higher
(smoothed) consumption profile. If we were to allow for a risky seller to reduce its counterparty
risk through contracting (i.e., having 4 instead of 3 states), we could achieve full separation for
some parameter range in which all risky sellers reveal. See Robustness Section 7.1 for a further
discussion.
4.2 Efficiency and Welfare with Asymmetric Information
To analyze the efficiency properties of the competitive equilibrium under asymmetric infor-




1 ) + pi2u(c
Sr
2 ) ≥ pi1u(cSs1 ) + pi2u(cSs2 ) (IC1)
pi1u(c
Ss
1 ) + pi2u(c
Ss
2 ) + pi3u(c
Ss
3 ) ≥ pi1u(cSr1 ) + pi2u(cSr2 ) + pi3u(0) (IC2)
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IC1 ensures that the consumption bundle intended for the risky type is indeed preferred by the
risky type. As in Section 3.2, to remain consistent with the assumption that no hedge for the failure
risk exists, the risky type receives nothing in state 3 regardless of which consumption bundle is
chosen. IC2 ensures that the safe type prefers its own consumption bundle. Analyzing IC1 and
IC2, it follows that if one is satisfied with equality, then the other is automatically satisfied. The
solution to this problem is considered in the proof to the following lemma.
Lemma 3 The asymmetric information competitive equilibrium is constrained inefficient.
Proof. See Appendix.
The inefficiency arises because a planner can achieve full revelation by cross subsidizing between
the two selling types, i.e., the planner is not restricted to earn zero expected profit in both seller
markets, as is the market maker. Further, as discussed below, relative to a market maker restricted
from holding an inventory, the social planner is also able to increase risk transfer since buyers are
rationed in equilibrium.
Lemma 3 suggests that an implementable Pareto improving policy exists. Indeed, there are
Pareto improving tax/subsidy market interventions that can be implemented. The key is that
such a policy must encourage revelation either by making pooling less desirable, or revelation more
desirable for the risky types. The following Proposition considers the imposition of a unit tax on
pooling sellers, resulting in the after-tax price P˜ − t.
Proposition 2 A transaction tax on pooling sellers is Pareto improving.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind this result can be seen by noting that the only net (after tax) price that
can hold in equilibrium is the before-tax price. This is because the tax drives pooling risky sellers
to reveal and thus makes the pool of higher quality. Since the payoff to revealing is independent of
the tax, the price in the pool adjusts as risky sellers reveal so that both safe and risky sellers are
just as well off with the tax than without. Although we focus on a simple tax to pooling sellers,
there are other policies which would yield a similar outcome. For example, a per-unit transaction
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subsidy on all sellers would favor revelation since risky sellers supply more with revelation. In this
case, an appropriate lump-sum (participation) tax could be used to finance the subsidy.
5 Inventory
The assumption of unlimited inventory simplifies the previous analysis; however, this is clearly
not a realistic assumption, especially in the presence of counterparty risk. For example, Shachar
(2012) provides evidence that such dealers are averse to holding large inventories due to counterparty
risk.13 In this section, we generalize our previous results on information revelation and consider
new implications of information asymmetry on the buy side of the market. We leave the reasons
for inventory restrictions unmodeled, although features such as risk aversion of the market maker
could be added to accomplish this; however, this would substantially complicate the analysis.
In a traditional asset market, restrictions on inventory are relatively straightforward: if a market
maker cannot hold any inventory, it can only sell as much as it buys. With risk transfer contracts
however, counterparty risk necessitates that the market maker bear some risk, i.e., although the
market maker can earn zero expected profit from each contract ex-ante, they do not necessarily
earn zero profit ex-post. To understand this, consider the case where there are no risky sellers.
In this setting, the amount that sellers pay the market maker in states 2 and 3 is the same.
If the market maker cannot hold an inventory, then in addition to earning zero expected profit
ex-ante due to competition, it must earn zero profit ex-post, regardless of which event occurs.
The total contract size that buyers request is NBγ
∗
B, which is paid to them in states 2 and 3,
where γ∗B solves (1). Sellers request NSsγ
∗
Ss, which they would owe to the market maker in state









B), the sellers (buyers) cannot generally obtain their optimal contract size. We
denote the total number of contracts that can be traded with the buyers or sellers as γMM , which




B). With this contract size, the market maker will make
zero profit in states 2 and 3. To verify that the market maker makes zero profit in state 1, we note
that they must pay the sellers γMMPSs, while they will receive γMMPB from the buyers. Thus,
they will break even in state 1 when PB = PSs, which turn out to be precisely the prices that
13Chen et al. (2011) also consider the issue of inventory and show that when taking large positions, the dealer may
hold the inventory temporarily, presumably to avoid market impact while hedging.
17
guarantee zero expected profits ex-ante and are described further in Section 3.1. Hence, the market
maker will earn zero expected profit ex-ante, as well as zero profit ex-post in all states of the world.








In state 3 however, the market maker must pay the buyers NBγ
∗





B from the sellers since the risky sellers do not pay in this state. It is relatively straightforward
to show that the market maker will not break even ex-post in state 1 either.
We must also consider how prices are formed through competition with limited inventory. With
unlimited inventory, it was simplest to view buyers and sellers interacting with just one market
maker. With limited inventory however, competition between market makers makes the potential
equilibria more complicated. To avoid undue distraction, we make a simple assumption which
determines prices as in the case of unlimited inventory; however, also allows us to analyze the
interesting effects that limited inventory can have on buyers and sellers. We assume that the
measure of market makers are limited on inventory, so that it must ration contracts to ensure
that it breaks even in state 2.14 However, we assume that individual market makers can hold a
“small” (i.e., infinitesimal) inventory. This assumption will lead to zero profit prices, and as will
be demonstrated, can lead to rationing of contracts. In Robustness section 7.2, we discuss how the
results of this section will come through in an environment in which prices can adjust and eliminate
rationing. Note that if contracts are rationed, we assume that in the presence of an excess of supply
(demand), the market maker rations the available contracts among the sellers (buyers) equally.
5.1 Limited Inventory with Full Information
When the inventory of the market maker is limited, the markets may not clear since either buyers
or sellers may not be able to obtain their optimal contract size. This can occur because the market
maker must make zero expected profit on each contract and so prices cannot adjust to eliminate
excess demand or supply. First, we extend Definition 1 to account for inventory restrictions.
14Similar results can be derived if they instead break even ex-post in states 1 or 3
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Definition 3 A full information competitive equilibrium with limited inventory is that of Definition
1, with the following additional condition:
iii. Market maker contracts satisfy (9).
When the market maker has inventory restrictions, there will generally be some rationing. The
following lemma summarizes.
Lemma 4 The full information competitive equilibrium with limited inventory is identical to that
with inventory if and only if





Thus the full information competitive equilibrium is efficient when the market maker is unre-
stricted in taking an inventory (Lemma 2), or when the market maker is restricted on inventory
and equation (10) is satisfied. When the market maker is restricted on inventory and markets do
not clear at zero expected profit prices (i.e., when (10) is not satisfied), full consumption smoothing
is not attained for either the buyers or sellers and the competitive equilibrium is inefficient. To aid
in the analysis of asymmetric information below, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2 When the market maker is restricted from taking inventory, equation (10) is as-
sumed to hold.
Thus, we will focus on the case in which the competitive equilibrium is efficient under full infor-
mation regardless of inventory restrictions. While not important for the results in the paper, this
assumption highlights the inefficiency from asymmetric information by starting with an efficient
equilibrium under full information.
5.2 Limited Inventory with Asymmetric Information
With no restrictions on inventory, buyers in our model are unaffected by the presence of asym-
metric information on the sell side of the market. This is not necessarily the case however, when the
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inventory of the market maker is restricted. We begin by determining how asymmetric information
affects the total number of contracts that sellers and buyers trade. In particular, how sellers react
to changes in prices will determine whether the total number of contracts increases or decreases
under asymmetric information. Defining ρ∗ and φ∗ as the corresponding equilibrium values of ρ
and φ, the total contract size requested from sellers under asymmetric information is:
NSsγSs(φ
∗) + (1− ρ∗)NSrγ + ρ∗NSrγSr. (11)
The first term is the total requested contract size of the safe sellers in the pool, the second term
is the total requested contract size of the pooling risky sellers, while the third term represents the
total requested contract size of the revealing risky sellers. Note that γSs(φ
∗) is the optimal contract
size of the safe sellers with asymmetric information. Total requested contract size of the sellers with
full information is NSsγSs(φ = 1) + NSrγSr, where γSs(φ = 1) is the optimal contract size of the
safe sellers under full information. We denote the difference between the total requested contract
size under full and asymmetric information as
∆ = NSr(1− ρ∗)[γSr − γ] +NSs[γSs(φ = 1)− γSs(φ∗)]. (12)
The first term represents the change in contract size for risky sellers who pool, whereas the second
term represents the change in contract size of safe sellers. Whether the total number of requested
contracts increases or decreases under asymmetric information (i.e., whether ∆ ≶ 0) cannot be
ascertained at the current level of generality. However, when the safe sellers’ contract supply curve
is upward sloping, so that requested contract size increases in price, then total requested contracts
decrease as a result of the information friction.
Lemma 5 If dγSsdPSs ≥ 0, then ∆ > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is that safe sellers decrease contract size in the pool relative to
the full information case and risky sellers also decrease contract size when pooling versus when they
are revealed, thus total contract size falls. In a standard asset market, appropriate assumptions
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on utility are often made to ensure that supply is upward sloping. For the risk transfer contract
modeled here, a higher price is interpreted as state contingent: more consumption can be obtained
in state 1 relative to state 2 for a fixed contract size. In this environment, we can ensure that
supply is upward sloping with appropriate restrictions on risk aversion and/or the size of the loss,
as is formalized in the following lemma.
Lemma 6 dγSsdPSs ≥ (<)0 when
−u′′(w+PSsγSs)(w+PSsγSs)
u′(w+PSsγSs)
≤ (>)1 + wPSsγSs .
Proof. See Appendix.
The left hand side of this expression is the safe sellers’ measure of relative risk aversion (evaluated
at state 1). We can bound the right hand side using L ≥ (1 + Pj)γj , ruling out “overinsurance”,
which cannot occur in the equilibrium in which we focus.15 Thus 1 + w/PSsγSs ≥ 1 + w/L. To
simplify the analysis, we make the following assumption which is assumed to hold throughout the
remainder of this section.
Assumption 3 When inventory is limited, we assume the coefficient of relative risk aversion is
less than (w + L)/L.
This ensures that safe seller supply is increasing in price (and thus ∆ > 0) and requires that relative
risk aversion is sufficiently low and/or the size of the loss being insured is a relatively small portion
of the sellers portfolio. It is important to note that dγSs/dPSs ≥ 0 is merely a sufficient condition
to ensure ∆ > 0, and that dγSs/dPSs < 0 can hold and ∆ > 0 still obtain. To understand why,
when dγSs/dPSs < 0, γSs increases with asymmetric information so that the safe sellers have an
increased contract size; however, this can be dominated by a drop in contract size of the risky
sellers.16 We now extend Definition 1 to account for inventory restrictions and then give the main
result as a simple extension of Proposition 1.
15In the equilibrium defined below, the price faced by the safe seller is never better than that which is actuarially
fair and thus they will not contract beyond full smoothing of consumption (nor is a negative choice of γSs optimal).
16Note that the analysis of the problem if ∆ < 0 is similar to what we present here; however, the equilibrium is
somewhat more complicated. Importantly, the self-revelation result to be detailed below can still obtain.
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Definition 4 A competitive equilibrium under asymmetric information with limited inventory is
that of Definition 2, with the following additional condition:
v. γMM = min(NSsγ
∗
Ss + (1− ρ)NSrγ + ρ∗NSrγ∗Sr, NBγ∗B), so that the market maker breaks-
even in state 2.
Corollary 1 The competitive equilibrium with asymmetric information and limited inventory is
unique and characterized by φ∗ ∈ [φ, 1). Self-revelation of a subset of risky sellers, φ∗ ∈ (φ, 1), can
be supported as an equilibrium.
The proof of this case is identical to that for Proposition 1 since there is only rationing on the buy
side of the market, and thus the sell side remains unchanged.
As is true in a standard model with asymmetric information, the low risk type (safe seller in
our context) is unambiguously worse off as a result of the information friction. On the other hand,
when φ∗ > φ, the risky seller receives the same utility with or without asymmetric information.
To understand this, note that when φ∗ > φ, there is revelation in equilibrium. The risky sellers
that reveal receive the same payoffs as with full information. Since the asymmetric information
competitive equilibrium requires that a risky seller is indifferent between pooling and revealing,
risky sellers’ that pool must have the same expected utility as the full information case.
On the buy side of the market, when the market maker can take unlimited inventory, buyers
always obtain the contract size they request since the information friction is irrelevant from their
perspective. With limited inventory however, the number of contracts to which the buyers can
obtain is affected by asymmetric information on the sell side. The following result follows easily
from Corollary 1.
Corollary 2 With restricted inventory, buyers are worse off due to the existence of asymmetric
information.
This follows simply from the reduction in total requested contract size of the sellers under asym-
metric information. As a result, the market maker must decrease the contract size available to the
buyers below that which is optimal. Hence, buyers are worse off under asymmetric information
than under full information. In light of this, we note that Proposition 2 can be extended to the
case with restricted inventory. The same argument applies, but in addition the increase in supply
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unambiguously increases buyer utility and so the tax achieves a Pareto improvement even in the
absence of any redistribution.
6 Concluding Remarks
We model an intermediated/dealer financial market for risk transfer under counterparty risk.
When sellers have asymmetric information on their own counterparty risk, in contrast to the classic
Akerlof (1970) lemons result, we show that some risky sellers may reveal themselves, allowing a
separating equilibrium to exist purely by market forces. The competitive equilibrium is shown
to be information constrained inefficient due to insufficient information revelation and a simple
transaction tax on pooling counterparties is shown to be Pareto improving.
Underlying the results of this paper is the assumption that the market maker is able to distin-
guish “large traders”. If the positions of buyers and sellers are completely hidden, then a separating
equilibrium of the type described in Proposition 1 is not possible. One of the proposed outcomes
of centralized clearing is that data can be collected on positions of its members. A potential ben-
efit claimed by regulators is that they can use this data to deduce whether risks are gathering in
particular parts of the financial system, or with specific financial institutions. We contend that be-
cause this information is used to identify parties that take large positions, it can actually promote
transparency through a previously unstudied mechanism; market players may willfully reveal their
own risk. The specific mechanism whereby a central counterparty (CCP) pools counterparty risk
is beyond the scope of the paper.17 However, we note that since the CCP is the eventual counter-
party in every transaction, the penalty to a revealed risky seller need not come only in the form of
a lower price as we have modeled here. The CCP itself could set higher participation charges on
the revealed risky seller, for example, through collateral requirements or contributions to a default
pool. The separating mechanism that we describe in the paper can then follow wherein a subset of
risky sellers reveal and obtain larger contract sizes, but are penalized by the CCP to account for
the increased counterparty risk to which they pose.
17For a general discussion on CCPs see Bliss and Steigerwald (2006).
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7 Robustness
7.1 Correlation of asset and risky seller failure
We assumed for simplicity that prob(ND,F ) = 0. This was done to make our risky and
safe sellers as homogenous as possible while still obtaining our results. When this assumption is
relaxed, our separation result becomes stronger; in particular, full separation wherein every risky
seller reveals its type can be supported as an equilibrium. To see this, define 4 states of the
world: pi1 = prob(ND,NF ), pi2 = prob(D,NF ), pi3 = prob(D,F ), pi4 = prob(ND,F ). Note that
pi1 = pi1 + pi4, pi2 = pi2 and pi3 = pi3. Consider the problem of a risky seller under full information:
max
γSr
pi1u(w + PSrγSr) + pi2u(w + L− γSr) + pi3u(0) + pi4u(PSrγSr), (13)
This leads to the optimal γ˜∗Sr defined implicitly by:
u′(w + L− γ˜∗Sr) =
pi1PSr
pi2




Comparing (14) to the first order condition from (3), it is apparent that risky sellers supply more
for any given price in this relaxed setting. Now consider the effect that this has under asymmetric
information. Proposition 1 showed that some risky sellers reveal to obtain a larger contract size.
The difference between the contract size in the pool, versus that which is supplied with revelation
is integral. When prob(ND,F ) > 0, risky sellers desire a larger contract size, making the incentive
to reveal even stronger. Furthermore, with prob(ND,F ) > 0, the risky sellers are able to smooth
over their failure state which they were not able to do when prob(ND,F ) = 0. Thus, it is possible
that all risky sellers reveal since they may not obtain sufficient consumption in their failure state
by pooling.
7.2 Rationing
The simplifying assumptions made in Section 5 allow us to consider the implications of inventory
restrictions in a setting most like that of Sections 2-4. That contracts are rationed in our equilibrium
is not vital to the results. In an environment in which prices may adjust to clear markets, similar
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results will obtain. In particular, continue to assume market makers are competitive and offer a
set of zero expected-profit prices; however, now assume that market makers cannot hold a “small”
inventory. In this case, contracts may not have zero profit prices in each market as in the paper.
Although more tedious than the analysis above, the zero expected profit assumption, the inventory
restriction, and the market-clearing condition can be used to characterize equilibrium prices.
In such an environment, buyers utility will again be reduced due to asymmetric information.
This occurs not through rationing of contracts as in the paper, but through the price mechanism.
Whereas the decrease in supply of contracts due to asymmetric information resulted in rationing for
buyers, now the market maker lowers the price for the buyers, in addition to increasing the price to
sellers. In other words, inventory restrictions imply that a decrease in contracts supplied requires a
decrease in contracts demanded. To satisfy the market maker’s zero expected profit condition, the
buyers price must increase to compensate for the increased price required to attract more supply.
In this environment, revelation as per Corollary 1 can still exist since the benefit to a risky seller
of revealing remains, and importantly, the key inefficiency result still obtains since pooling risky




Proof of Lemma 1
At zero expected profit prices, the first order conditions for problems (1), (2), and (3) are












respectively. Since u′ > 0, (15) and (16) imply that both buyers and safe sellers smooth consumption
over all states, while (17) implies that the risky seller smoothes consumption over states 1 and 2.
Further; γ∗B = γ
∗
Ss = pi1L, γ
∗
Sr = pi1L/(pi1 + pi2).
Proof of Lemma 2
Define the Lagrange multiplier on FA1 as λ1, FA2 as λ2, and FA3 as λ3. The first-order conditions
for the Pareto problem (4) can be written as follows.
θSru
′(cSri ) = λi/pii for i ∈ {1, 2} (18)
θSsu
′(cSsi ) = λi/pii for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} (19)
θBu
′(cBi ) = λi/pii for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} (20)
θM = λi/pii for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} (21)
Since u′(cki ) = θM/θk for k ∈ {B,Ss, Sr}, consumption is constant across states (except the failure
state at the risky seller). To show that the competitive equilibrium is efficient, we characterize
the set of Pareto weights that correspond to this allocation. Consumption in each state of the
competitive equilibrium is cB = w − L(1 − pi1), cSs = w + L(1 − pi1) and cSr = w + L(pi2/(pi1 +
pi2)). Combining u
′(cki ) = θM/θk and
∑











) , and θk 6=M = θM
u′(ck)
. (22)
Proof of Proposition 1
Step 1 proves that there exists a φ∗ ∈ [φ, 1), and step 2 shows that there exists parameters for
which φ∗ > φ.
Step 1
Suppose φ∗ = 1. Then V(1) ≥ 0. Using γ∗Sr = pi1L/(pi1 + pi2), γ∗Ss = pi1L from Lemma 1, and

















+ pi2u (w + L− γ)
≥ (pi1 + pi2)u (w + L(1− pi1)) ≥ 0
⇒ pi1 + pi2 ≥ 1. (23)
The second inequality follows by putting γ∗Ss in place of γ since we know that γ ≥ γ∗Ss. The last
inequality provides a contradiction since pi3 > 0 and pi1 + pi2 + pi3 = 1. Hence, φ
∗ < 1. If V(φ) ≤ 0,
then φ∗ = φ. If V(φ) > 0, then, since V is continuous, by the intermediate value theorem there
exists a φ∗ ∈ (φ, 1) such that V(φ∗) = 0.
Step 2
Let all risky sellers pool and the relative number of risky to safe sellers be arbitrarily large, so that
φ = φ→ 0 and P˜ → PSr. Then, it must be that at least one risky seller would wish to reveal, i.e.,
φ∗ > φ, since γSr is the optimal contract size (and γ is suboptimal) given PSr.
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Proof of Lemma 3
Substituting P˜ (φ) = (pi2 + φpi3)/pi1 into the first order condition for problem (2) yields




u′(w + PSsγ∗Ss). (24)
Since φ∗ < 1 (Proposition 1), the safe seller does not smooth consumption over states 1 and 2 in the
competitive equilibrium. Turning to the social planning problem, the first-order condition for the
market maker is identical to the full information problem (where again, the Lagrange multipliers
on the constraints are represented by λi),
θM = λi/pii for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. (25)
Using (25), the first-order conditions for the sellers are
u′(cSri ) =
θMNSr
θSrNSr + α1 − α2 , for i ∈ {1, 2} (26)
u′(cSs1 ) = u
′(cSs2 ) =
θMNSs





Where α1 and α2 are the Lagrange multipliers for (IC1) and (IC2) respectively. Since the allocation
in the Pareto problem has consumption smoothing over states 1 and 2 for the safe seller, while the
competitive equilibrium does not, the competitive equilibrium cannot be on the Pareto frontier and
so is constrained inefficient.
Proof of Proposition 2
We first show that a small increase in t has no impact on the utility of safe sellers. The competition
assumption implies that the tax on contracts in the pooled market falls entirely on the sellers, so






The safe seller problem is
max
γSs
pi1u(w + P˜ (t)γSs) + (pi2 + pi3)u(w + L− γSs), (29)
which yields the optimal supply γ(P˜ (t), w, L) and indirect utility v(P˜ (t), w, L). Differentiating








We differentiate the equilibrium condition (8) with respect to the tax, which yields
0 = −pi1u′(w + P˜ γ)γ dP˜
dt
. (31)
Thus dP˜ /dt = 0, and so dv/dt = 0 from (30). Therefore, risky sellers that reveal are indifferent to
the tax since their utility is independent of a tax on the pool. Since dP˜ /dt = 0, risky sellers who
pool are also unaffected by the tax. Therefore, a lump sum redistribution of the tax to the buyer
for example, would yield a Pareto improvement.
Proof of Lemma 4






Sr, in which case the allocation is
identical to that without inventory restrictions. At zero expected profit prices, γ∗B = γ
∗
Ss = pi1L,






Sr reduces to (10).
Proof of Lemma 5
The first term in (12) is positive by assumption. The second term is non-negative since γSs(φ =
1) > γSs(φ = φ
∗) when dγSs/dPSs > 0 and γSs(φ = 1) = γSs(φ = φ∗) when dγSs/dPSs = 0.
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Proof of Lemma 6




−pi1 (u′(w + PSsγSs) + PSsγSsu′′(w + PSsγSs))
(pi2 + pi3)u′′(w + L− γSs) + pi1P 2Ssu′′(w + PSsγSs)
. (32)
The denominator of (32) is negative, and so the sign of dγSs/dPSs is determined by the numerator.






Multiplying both sides by (w + PSsγSs) yields the condition in Lemma 6.
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